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Partisan news sources of all 
political stripes would have us be-
lieve that there’s a war raging on 
in American society. Increasingly 
prevalent is the notion that Amer-
ica is in the grips of what some de-
spairing analysts (and gleeful news 
anchors) have labeled a “Culture 
War”- the ultimate expression of 
our increasingly polarized political 
life, in which the two competing 
viewpoints stay in their own yards, 
only seeking out media sources 
that validate their existing ide-
als, and lobbing attacks across the 
fence at the enemy camp. 
The Culture War mentality has 
become so pervasive that battle jar-
gon is an accepted part of our ev-
eryday news cycle, to the point that 
most Americans are not phased 
when the controversies and poli-
cies under discussion are immedi-
ately framed as being part of, not 
just a broader ideological debate 
between two opposing parties, but 
an all-out war. Journalists, politi-
cians, and policy pushers from ev-
ery sphere of influence are guilty of 
this polarization fear mongering. 
They present a political landscape 
in which reasoned speech geared 
towards compromise is exhaust-
ed. To the consumer of American 
cha l lenged, 
however, it is 
a self-fulfill-
ing prophe-
cy that seeps 
into Ameri-
can political 
c o n s c i o u s -
ness at every 
level, and 
blurs the line between healthy par-
tisan sparring and harmful discord 
within our democracy.The com-
monly accepted notion is that, by 
and large, Americans hold views 
that follow one of two prevailing 
ideologies: “the culturally ortho-
dox, who hold a traditional, reli-
gious, absolutist view of morality, 
and the culturally progressive, who 
hold a modern, secular, relativistic 
view of morality.1” This is more 
broadly and simply summed up as 
the competing narratives of Con-
servative and Liberal Progressive 
ideology. What the American pub-
lic observes as a trend of mounting 
tension between political camps in 
the U.S., made worse by consistent 
media caricatures of who populates 
the left and right sides of the aisle, 
lead many to believe that the scope 
of cultural division in America is 
great enough to warrant the diag-
nosis of Culture War. This miscon-
ception persists despite the many 
data-supported assurances that we 
remain, overwhelmingly, a politi-
cally centrist nation. In fact, a 2014 
Pew Poll affirms that a healthy 
thirty-nine percent of Americans 
view themselves as centrists, and 
the majority of partisan Americans 
still occupy a position in the cen-
ter-left or center-right of the spec-
trum of American politics.2
The reality of America’s cen-









agated by the 
media we 
consume, which frames events 
and narratives to fuel ideological 
hostilities- to the point where both 
sides truly believe that their val-
ues, ideals, and very way of life 
To the consumer of 
American news media, it 
seems only bitter conflict 
remains between the two 
competing factions of the 
Culture War.
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news media, it seems only bitter 
conflict remains between the two 
competing factions of the Culture 
War. 
Recent studies affirm th at  th e 
state of Culture War did not arise 
naturally from ideological divides 
in the U.S.—it is a product of our 
media and political environment. 
The hyper-defensive rhetoric of 
Culture War, which pits the public 
against each other based on their 
differing value narratives, serves 
as useful fodder during conten-
tious elections and policy disputes; 
a distortion often utilized by the 
vocal minorities hanging on to the 
fringe of the American left and 
right. Left un-
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is under attack, as though coexis-
tence or balance is not an option. 
All day long updates from the front 
lines of the Culture War float by 
on social media and network news 
feeds: the War on Business, the War 
on Women, the War on Christmas, 
the War on the Middle Class, and 
so on. When MSNBC discusses the 
2016 GOP race as a “relaunch” of 
the “culture wars,” and Fox News 
laments that Christians may have 
“lost the culture war,” they’re in-
dulging in this sensationalized 
narrative.34 While there are most 
certainly identifiable and compet-
ing moral narratives in the United 
States, media outlets overstate this 
in their constant invoking of Culture 
War. They take for granted the idea 
that all Conservatives and Liberals 
sit on polar opposite ends of every 
issue, cohesive in their worldviews 
and what informs them, ramped 
up for a fight and not looking for a 
moderate balance--despite the data 
that says otherwise. 
The result of this sensational-
ism is a mindset that is detrimental 
to honest discourse and bipartisan 
policymaking. In wartime, our tra-
ditional respect for the market-
place of ideas, and the necessity of 
weighing a multitude of perspec-
tives to achieve balanced political 
outcomes, is abandoned in order 
to deal with the immediate threat 
to our values posed by the cultural 
opposition. 27% of Democrats now 
perceive Republicans as a “threat 
to the well-being of the country,” 
while 36% of Republicans fear the 
Democratic Party will be our undo-
ing. 5The acceptance of the Culture 
War may liven up the news cycle 
and fire the public up online, but it is 
ultimately harmful for democracy. 
The rigid, moral narratives we sub-
scribe to about what each group rep-
resents cause a knee-jerk disdain for 
the opposing side- which naturally 
disinclines us to consider aspects of 
their viewpoint. The consequences 
for policy-making are clear: the av-
erage “consistent liberal” believes 
that Obama should be “meeting 
congressional Republicans only 
one-third of the way,” while “con-
sistent conservatives” on average 
believe that “congressional Repub-
licans should get 66% of what they 
want, while Obama should get just 
34% of what he wants.6” It is worth 
emphasizing that this concerning 
break with a commitment to biparti-
san decision-making is reflective of 
those sitting in the strongly partisan 
camps, and not the middle. Even so, 
these levels of political hostility are 
informed by Culture War, and are 
perpetuated in part by its continued 
place in our national conversation. 
An article published in Stan-
ford Social Innovation Review by 
Andrew J. Hoffman, Holcim (US) 
Professor of Sustainable Enterprise 
at the University of Michigan, takes 
the examination of this issue a step 
further. Hoffman suggests that when 
it comes to wedge issues like cli-
mate change, loyalty to partisan al-
legiances often prevent people from 
examining data objectively. There 
have been significant fluctuations of 
Americans’ belief in climate change 
in just the last decade; it was found 
that “the percentage of Conserva-
tives and Republicans who believe 
that the effects of global warming 
have already begun declined from 
roughly 50 percent in 2001 to about 
30 percent in 2010, while the cor-
responding percentage for liber-
als and Democrats increased from 
roughly 60 percent in 2001 to about 
70 percent in 2010.” The Culture 
War mentality is cited as the reason 
why the “scientific consensus” on 
the issue is being ignored, and why 
party alignment can reliably predict 
an individual’s stance on an issue 
as vital as the environment.7 Hoff-
man concludes that productive dis-
cussions on how to tackle climate 
change are often stalled by the Cul-
ture War and its shaping of political 
attitudes, which can have very real 
consequences for public opinion, 
and ultimately for public policy. 
The issue of climate change, 
he maintains, remains in question 
despite broad scientific rulings be-
cause it “provokes a violent debate 
among cultural communities on one 
side who perceive their values to be 
threatened by change, and cultural 
communities on the other side who 
perceive their values to be threat-
ened by the status quo.” In other 
words, strongly partisan Conserva-
tives and Liberals are too busy try-
ing to defend their respective moral 
grounds to have a reasonable ex-
change. To begin to tackle the press-
ing issue of climate change as a na-
tion, Hoffman believes that the only 
way to see beyond the “ideological 
filters” that define the discourse on 
environmental issues is to engage 
the “majority in the middle.8” 
As far as how we arrived at this 
point, tracing the Culture War back 
to its origin reveals a pivotal shift 
in the nature of American political 
consciousness that began our de-
cline into hyper defensive rhetoric. 
Following a period of depolariza-
tion after World War II, the impor-
tance of partisan identities and the 
role they play in predicting voting 
behavior was observed to reach “its 
highest level in at least 50 years” 
in the mid-nineties.9 It was at this 
time that the “polarization narra-
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tive” became central to political 
discourse. Emphasis on wedge is-
sues like abortion, gay marriage, 
and climate change, which had been 
steadily moving into the forefront 
of the national conversation since 
the 1970’s, highlighted the sharp-
er contrast between the moral val-
ues of Conservatives and Liberals, 
and culminated in the nineties with 
the expression of deep polarization 
anxieties. 10 Politicians and pundits, 
making the logical leap that the up-
swing of partisan polarization also 
reflected mass cultural polarization, 
began sounding the drums of Cul-
ture War. This came to life visually 
in the form of the now iconic red 
and blue map of the United States, 
unveiled by network news stations 
in the early 2000s to provide a more 
stirring visual for election tracking. 
This image, neatly dividing the na-
tion along regional, cultural lines 
has grown to represent our under-
standing of the political landscape 
of the U.S. completely; an oversim-
plification that we take for grant-
ed when we speak of red and blue 
states as though their populations 
are uniform, clustered around the 
same space of the far left or right of 
the spectrum. 11
Though the familiar narrative of 
escalating political tension is seldom 
questioned by the American public, 
recent studies cast doubt on the as-
sumed connection between parti-
san polarization and Culture War. 
The categorization of Americans as 
centrists, grouped between the cen-
ter-left and center-right of the polit-
ical spectrum, still holds true.12 Ad-
ditionally, a 2008 study published in 
the Annual Review of Political Sci-
ence attributes the widespread fears 
of mass polarization to the phenom-
enon of “party sorting” that has 
taken place in American politics in 
recent decades. Party sorting is the 
“increased correlation between pol-
icy views and party identification,” 
which also correlates with the rise 
of “elite polarization” along party 
lines. The researchers maintain that, 
although the effect of elite and party 
polarization has been the drawing 
of more distinct partisan lines on 
the issues, and the shrinking of the 
moderate base on both sides of the 
lawmaking aisle, the American pub-
lic on the whole has not followed 
suit.13
Meanwhile, despite the contin-
ued vitality of the American political 
center, claims of Culture War keep 
cropping up. Media outlets either 
decry the breakdown of American 
solidarity, or choose sides. It’s not 
difficult to see why the American 
public is feeling pessimistic about 
political gridlock when publications 
like The Atlantic beg the question 
of “Are Liberals Losing the Culture 
Wars?” as though the validity of the 
Culture War itself bears no consid-
eration.14 In reality, mass polariza-
tion has not occurred to an extent 
that comes close to warranting such 
a diagnosis; press accounts of crip-
pling ideological divides among the 
general public are revealed, on clos-
er inspection, to be more alarmist 
than fact-informed.15 2014 Pew Poll 
data affirms that, for the most part, 
it’s the already strongly partisan 
camps that are experiencing more 
drastic levels of polarization-- with 
ninety-two percent of Republicans 
polling as “more conservative than 
the median Democrat,” and nine-
ty-four percent of Democrats poll-
ing as “more liberal than the median 
Republican.” The middle, however, 
is still in favor of balanced policy 
outcomes. The same Pew Poll re-
ports that the “majority [of Amer-
icans] do not have uniformly con-
servative or liberal views. Most do 
not see either party as a threat to the 
nation. And more believe their rep-
resentatives in government should 
meet halfway to resolve contentious 
disputes rather than hold out for 
more of what they want.16” 
The claim that polarization has 
directly given rise to the Culture 
War is also challenged, as the study 
maintained that “the worldviews of 
Americans, like their sociocultur-
al characteristics, turn out on close 
inspection to imply less about po-
litical polarization than is often as-
sumed.17” In other words, the link 
between polarization and cultural 
disparities is weaker than Culture 
War mongers would have the Amer-
ican public believe. While the rhet-
oric declaring the onset of a culture 
war arose naturally out of polar-
ization concerns, the question of to 
what degree political polarization is 
on the rise has minimal bearing on 
the legitimacy of the Culture War, 
because Culture War is the way we 
collectively engage in political dis-
course- it’s a matter of choice. The 
doomsayers perpetuating this nar-
rative are offering a grim diagnosis 
while ignoring the cure; diffusing 
the hysteria over political hostilities 
by looking to the center, instead of 
the disproportionately represented 
views of the vocal minorities. 
The epidemic of political hostil-
ity is shown to be greatly exagger-
ated in one sense, and a legitimate 
concern in another. On one hand, it 
can be fairly said that the Culture 
War is more a product of political 
manipulation and media sensation-
alism, in reaction to concerns about 
growing polarization, than it is true 
reflection of the scope of the cul-
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tural gap between most people who 
identify as either a Conservative or 
a Liberal in America. On the other 
hand, the widespread belief in the 
Culture War has indeed fueled hos-
tilities between opposing parties 
to the point where it defines dis-
course. The only hope for a truce is 
to debunk the exaggerated cultural 
gap by engaging in meaningful ex-
change. 
 It is true, we are a nation 
divided. There are regional, ideo-
logical, cultural separations. While 
this naturally lends itself to political 
tussling, it is important to remem-
ber that in a democracy as diverse 
as ours, there is nothing inherently 
wrong with being divided. A healthy 
democracy is a living thing, messy 
and even volatile at times. We are 
locked in the same state of ideo-
logical sparring that has existed, in 
varying forms, since the founding of 
our nation. It is not the existence of 
opposing parties, or even the pos-
sibility of rising polarization, that 
threatens the health of our democra-
cy, but rather the notion that we are 
at war. War must not to be accepted 
as the standard state of affairs in our 
political discourse; wars represent 
the frustration of productive dis-
course, as they are what nations re-
sort to when diplomacy fails. In war, 
one party aims to defeat the other, 
weaken them to the point of irrel-
evancy. Democracy is about group 
consensus, the constant struggle be-
tween multitudes of perspectives for 
policy outcomes-- but in the context 
of a Culture War, opposing sides ac-
tually try to silence each other. The 
waging of Culture War is not a nat-
ural byproduct of polarization- it is 
a choice we make every day that we 
accept an extreme representation of 
ourselves as valid. 
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